Abstract. An instance of the stable marriage problem is an undirected bipartite graph G = (X∪W, E) with linearly ordered adjacency lists with ties allowed in the ordering. A matching M is a set of edges, no two of which share an endpoint. An edge e = (a, b) ∈ E \ M is a blocking edge for M if a is either unmatched or strictly prefers b to its partner in M, and b is unmatched, strictly prefers a to its partner in M, or is indifferent between them. A matching is strongly stable if there is no blocking edge with respect to it. We give an O(nm) algorithm for computing strongly stable matchings, where n is the number of vertices and m the number of edges. The previous best algorithm had running time O(m 2 ). We also study this problem in the hospitals-residents setting, which is a many-to-one extension of the aforementioned problem. We give an O(m h∈H p h ) algorithm for computing a strongly stable matching in the hospitals-residents problem, where p h is the quota of a hospital h. The previous best algorithm had running time O(m 2 ).
Introduction
An instance of the stable marriage problem is an undirected bipartite graph G = (X∪ W, E) where the adjacency lists of vertices are linearly ordered with ties allowed. As is customary, we call the vertices of the graph men and women, respectively.
1 Each person seeks to be assigned to a person of the opposite sex and her/his preference is given by the ordering of her/his adjacency list. In a's list, if the edges (a, b) and (a, b ) are tied, we say that a is indifferent between b and b , and if the edge (a, b) strictly precedes (a, b ), we say that a prefers b to b . Preference lists are not necessarily complete, meaning that each person may rank only a subset of the persons of the opposite sex. Note that preference lists are consistent in the sense that a person a appears in b's list if and only if b appears in a's list. Consistency of preference lists will be assumed throughout. A pair (a, b) is acceptable if each of a and b are on the other's preference list. All edges e ∈ E correspond to acceptable pairs. We use n for the number of vertices and m = |E| for the number of edges. A stable marriage problem is called complete if G is the complete bipartite graph.
A matching M is a set of edges, no two of which share an endpoint. If (a, b) ∈ M we call b the partner of a. A matching M is strongly stable if there is no edge (a, b) ∈ E \ M (called a blocking edge) such that by becoming matched with each other, one of a and b (say, a) is better off and b is not worse off. A person a is better off means that she/he is either unmatched in M or strictly prefers b to her/his partner in M, and a is not worse off if she/he is either better off or is indifferent between b and her/his partner in M. In other words, a would prefer to be matched with b and b would not object to the change.
In this article, we consider the problem of computing a strongly stable matching. One of the motivations for this form of stability is the following. Suppose we have a matching M and there exists a blocking edge (a, b) . Suppose it is a that becomes better off by becoming matched to b. This means that a is willing to take some action to improve her/his situation and as b's situation would not get worse, she/he might yield to a. If there exists no such edge, then M can be considered to be stable, since no two vertices a and b, where (a, b) is in E \ M, improve by changing their present state and becoming matched with each other. Observe that not every instance of the stable marriage problem has a strongly stable solution. Figure 1 shows an instance of the stable marriage problem with no strongly stable solution.
The stable marriage problem can also be studied in the more general context of hospitals and residents. This is a many-to-one extension of the classical men-women version. An instance of the hospitals-residents problem is again an undirected FIG. 1. Both women prefer x 2 to x 1 . The man x 1 prefers w 1 to w 2 and x 2 is indifferent between the women. The instance is complete and hence any strongly stable matching must match all men and all women. The matching {(x 1 , w 1 ), (x 2 , w 2 )} is not strongly stable, since w 1 prefers x 2 to x 1 and x 2 is indifferent between w 1 and w 2 . The matching {(x 1 , w 2 ), (x 2 , w 1 )} is not strongly stable since w 2 prefers x 2 to x 1 and x 2 is indifferent between w 1 and w 2 .
bipartite graph (R∪ H, E) with linearly ordered (allowing ties) adjacency lists. Each resident r ∈ R seeks to be assigned to exactly one hospital, and each hospital h ∈ H has a specified number p h of posts, referred to as its quota. A matching M is a set of edges, no two of which share the same resident, and at most p h of the edges in M can share the hospital h.
A blocking edge to a matching is defined similarly as in the case of men-women. An edge (a, b) ∈ E \ M is a blocking edge to M if a would prefer to be matched with b and b would not object to the change. A matching is strongly stable if there is no blocking edge with respect to it. Again we assume that the preference lists are consistent. We also consider the problem of computing a strongly stable matching in this setting. Observe that the classical stable marriage problem is a special case of this general problem by setting p h = 1 for all hospitals.
In this article we give an O(nm) algorithm to determine a strongly stable matching for the classical stable marriage problem or to report that no such matching exists. We also give an O(m h∈H p h ) algorithm to compute a strongly stable matching in the hospitals-residents problem or to report that no such matching exists. Previous results for computing strongly stable matchings are as follows. Irving [1994] gave an O(n 4 ) algorithm for computing strongly stable matchings for men-women in complete stable marriage instances where there are equal numbers of men and women. In Manlove [1999] the author extended the algorithm to incomplete bipartite graphs; the extended algorithm has running time O(m 2 ). In Irving et al. [2003] an O(m 2 ) algorithm was given for computing a strongly stable matching for the hospitals-residents problem.
Our new algorithm for computing a strongly stable matching for the classical stable marriage problem can be viewed as a specialization of Irving's algorithm, that is, every run of our algorithm is a run of his, but not vice versa. We obtain the improved running time by introducing the concept of levels. Every vertex has a level associated with it; the level of a vertex can change during the algorithm. We use the levels of vertices to search for special matchings which are level-maximal and this makes the running time of the algorithm O(nm). We also use the aforementioned ideas in the hospitals-residents problem and obtain an improvement over Irving et al. [2003] . We do not assume that the input graphs are complete bipartite graphs.
The stable marriage problem has great practical significance. The hospitalsresidents problem has widespread application to matching schemes that match graduating medical students to hospital posts [Irving 1998; Roth 1984; CaRMS 2007] . The classical results in stable marriage are the Gale-Shapley theorem and algorithm [Gale and Shapley 1962] . In these instances, it is assumed that there are no ties and each person ranks all members of the opposite sex in strict order of preference. Then there always exists at least one stable matching and the GaleShapley algorithm finds one in O(n 2 ) time. However, when ties are allowed, finding a stable matching seems more difficult. There are, in fact, two more notions of stability in matchings. The matching M is said to be weakly stable (or super stable) if there does not exist a pair (a, b) ∈ E \ M such that by becoming matched to each other both a and b are better off (respectively, neither is worse off). The problem of finding a weakly stable matching of maximum size was recently proven to be NP-hard [Iwama et al. 1999] . There is a simple O(n 2 ) algorithm [Irving 1994 ] to determine whether a super stable matching exists and to compute one, if so. Gusfield and Irving [1989] cover plenty of results obtained in the area of stable matchings.
In Section 2 we present our O(nm) algorithm for strongly stable matchings for the classical stable marriage problem. In Section 3 we present our O(m h∈H p h ) algorithm for the hospitals-residents problem. We conclude with some open problems in Section 4.
The Algorithm for Strongly Stable Marriage
We review a variant of Irving's algorithm [1994] in Section 2.1 and then describe our modifications in Section 2.2. Figure 2 contains a concise write-up of our algorithm.
2.1. IRVING'S ALGORITHM. We review a variant of Irving's algorithm for strongly stable matchings. The algorithm proceeds in phases and maintains two graphs G and G c ; G and G c are subgraphs of G. Moreover, G c is the current graph of edges E c in which we compute maximum matchings and G is the graph of edges E not yet considered relevant. In each phase, a certain subset of the edges of G is moved to G c . Also edges get deleted from G and G c . We use E i to denote the edges moved in phase i and E ≤i to denote the edges moved in the first i phases. Initially, we have G = G and E c = ∅.
At the beginning of phase i, E c ⊆ E <i and we have a maximum matching M in G c . Also, if a man is free with respect to M then no edges of E c are incident to him. Let E i consist of the most preferred edges 2 in E of each free man. We say that every free man in succession proposes to all women currently at the top of his list. When a woman receives a proposal from a man x, she deletes all strict successors of x from E and E c . This may also remove edges in M.
Observe that the rules for adding and deleting edges guarantee that if (a, b) ∈ E c and (a, b ) ∈ E c , then a is indifferent between b and b . For a free man x, all of his top choices are moved to E c and hence edges in E go to strictly inferior women. A woman keeps only the best proposals made to her and hence edges in E go either to strictly superior men or to men tied with her choices in E c .
Next we extend M to a maximum matching in E c . During this process, further edges may be deleted. We iterate over the free men in arbitrary order. Let x be any free man. If there is an augmenting path starting at x, we use it to increase the cardinality of the matching. Otherwise, let Z be the set of men reachable from x by alternating paths and let N (Z ) be the set of women adjacent to Z in E c . For each woman w ∈ N (Z ) we delete 3 all lowest ranked edges in E c ∪ E (i.e, all edges tied for last place in the list restricted to E c ∪ E ) incident to her. This is at least one edge (x , w) ∈ E c and zero or more edges (x , w) ∈ E .
At the end of the phase, we have a maximum matching in E c . Also, every free man x is isolated in G c , since the edges incident to x were removed when we searched for an augmenting path starting from x.
The algorithm terminates when all free men have run out of proposals. Let M be the final matching and let G c be the final graph. Then M is a maximum matching in G c and all free men are isolated in G c and G . M is a strongly stable matching in G if no woman that was ever nonisolated in G c during the execution of the algorithm is free with respect to M.
The following lemmas were shown in Irving [1994] and Manlove [1999] .
LEMMA 2.1. If an edge e = (x, w) is deleted during the execution, it cannot block any matching output by the algorithm.
PROOF. Let M be a matching output by our algorithm. Suppose e was deleted in phase i. This means that w had some edge incident to her during phase i in G c . So, w has to be matched in M. Otherwise, our algorithm would have declared that there is no strongly stable matching. So, in M, w has to be paired to a man she prefers to x. And hence, e is nonblocking. LEMMA 2.2. If the algorithm returns a matching, the matching is strongly stable.
PROOF. Assume otherwise, that is, the algorithm returns a matching M and yet a blocking edge e = (x, w) exists. Then e was never deleted during the execution by Lemma 2.1 and hence e ∈ E c ∪ E when the algorithm terminates. By the termination condition and since M is declared strongly stable, x must be matched in M. Since e blocks M, x cannot prefer his partner in M to w, and since the edge connecting x with his partner in M is not deleted, x cannot prefer w to his partner in M. Thus x is indifferent between w and his partner in M. When x proposed to his partner in M, he also proposed to w. At this time (x, w) was added to G c . Thus w was a nonisolated node during the execution of the algorithm and hence is matched in M. The partner of w is tied with x in w's preference list and hence e is nonblocking.
Let us call an edge strongly stable if it belongs to some strongly stable matching. PROOF. Assume otherwise, and let e = (x, w) be the first strongly stable edge deleted by the algorithm. Let M be a strongly stable matching containing e. We distinguish cases according to why e was deleted.
Assume first that e is deleted because w receives a better proposal, say from x . Then w strictly prefers x to x. When x proposes to w, all edges (x , w ) with w strictly preceding w in x 's preference list have been discarded already and hence none of them can be strongly stable. We conclude that the partner of x in M is either tied with w or after w in the preference list of x , and x is before x in w's preference list. Thus (x , w) blocks M, a contradiction.
Assume next that at some point of the execution we have a free man x 0 from which no augmenting path starts. Let E c be the edge set of the current graph when we search for augmenting paths from x 0 and let M c be the current matching. Let Z be the set of men reachable from x 0 by alternating paths and let N (Z ) be the women adjacent to them in E c . Then |Z | = |N (Z )| + 1 and every woman in N (Z ) is matched with a man in Z by M c . Also w ∈ N (Z ) and e is a lowest ranked edge incident to w. Let E be the set of lowest ranked edges incident to women in N (Z ), that is, E is the set of edges which the algorithm removes after discovering the fact that no augmenting path starting at x 0 exists.
Consider M ∩ E, let U be their female endpoints, and let Z be their male endpoints. Then w ∈ U and hence U = ∅. Also, M matches men in Z and women in U with each other, Thus
We next show the existence of an edge e = (x , w ) ∈ E c with x ∈ Z \ Z and w ∈ U and then show that it blocks M. Assume that M c contains no such edge. Then M c pairs the women in U with men in Z and since |Z | = |U |, M c pairs the men in Z with the women in U . We conclude x 0 ∈ Z \ Z , as x 0 is free. Consider the alternating path (with respect to M c ) from x 0 to w and let e = (a, b) be the first edge on this path with b ∈ U ∪ Z . If b ∈ Z , then e is a matching edge and hence a ∈ U , contradicting that (a, b) is the first edge on this path with b ∈ U ∪ Z . Thus, b ∈ U and a ∈ Z \ Z and we have shown the existence of the desired edge.
Since w ∈ U , this implies that w is matched in M to a man tied with x in her preference list. Furthermore, in M, x is either unmatched or matched to a woman strictly after w in his preference list. To see this, note that x cannot be matched in M with any edge that has already been deleted, by the assumption that (x, w) is the first strongly stable edge deleted. The only remaining case is if x is matched in M with a woman w who is tied with w in his preference list and edge (x , w ) is not already deleted. But then edge (x , w ) ∈ E, a contradiction to the fact that x ∈ Z \ Z . We conclude that (x , w ) blocks M, a contradiction.
LEMMA 2.4. Assume a strongly stable matching exists. Then the algorithm returns a strongly stable matching. Also all strongly stable matchings have the same cardinality and match the same set of men and women.
PROOF. Let M 0 be a strongly stable matching. By Lemma 2.3, no edge of M 0 is ever deleted and hence M 0 ⊆ E c ∪ E at termination. Let M be the final matching computed by the algorithm. We show first that |M| = |M 0 | and that both matchings match the same set of men and women.
All men free in M are isolated in E c ∪ E and hence are free in M 0 . Thus every man matched by M 0 is also matched by M and hence |M 0 | ≤ |M|. Assume that there is a woman w which is nonisolated in G c and free with respect to M 0 . Let (x, w) ∈ E c be an edge incident to w. Then (x, w) blocks M 0 , since x cannot strictly prefer its partner in M 0 to w. Thus M 0 matches all nonisolated women of G c and M certainly cannot match more women. Thus |M| ≤ |M 0 |. We conclude that both matchings have the same cardinality and match exactly the nonisolated nodes of G c . This proves the second claim.
Assume next that the algorithm declares that M is not stable. By the preceding, M matches all nonisolated nodes of G c .
Suppose there is a woman w which is free in M and was nonisolated during the execution of the algorithm. Then w is also free in M 0 . Let e = (x, w) be the last edge incident to w during the execution. After e was deleted, no edge in E c ∪ E incident to x is strictly before e in the preference list of x. Thus e blocks M 0 .
The algorithm runs in O(m 2 ) time, since the cost summed over all phases is O(m · (1 + number of successful augmenting path computations)). The number of augmenting path computations is at most m, since a matched man becomes free only if the matching edge incident to him is deleted. For a detailed analysis we refer the interested reader to Irving et al. [2003] .
2.2. THE NEW ALGORITHM. We show how to modify the algorithm so that it runs in time O(nm). Our method maintains level-maximal matchings and uses level-maximal augmenting paths.
The running time of the algorithm for finding a strongly stable matching is actually the time spent on looking for augmenting paths. We introduce the notion of the level of an edge and the level of a vertex which will help us to search for augmenting paths in a streamlined manner. Vertices with higher levels are given precedence when searching for augmenting paths. When we search for augmenting paths with this precedence and succeed in finding one, then we can show that the level numbers of all the edges traversed are at least the level number of the unmatched vertex at the end of the augmenting path. This allows us to bound the total number of edges traversed in our search for augmenting paths.
Definition 2.5. Let E i be the edges added to G c in phase i and define the level l(e) of an edge to be the phase when this edge was first added to G c . Edges never added to G c have no level assigned to them.
So, the set of edges ever added to G c consists of the disjoint union E 1 ∪E 2 ∪. . . E r , where r is the total number of phases in the algorithm. Note that r ≤ m. PROOF. If there is such an alternating path, then the endpoint of the path is a matched woman. Augmentation increases the level of the matching and does not change the set of matched men.
For the converse, assume that M is not level-maximal. Let M be level-maximal and matching the same men. Then M ⊕ M is a set of alternating paths and cycles. Augmenting a cycle does not change the level sum. Thus, there must be at least one path whose augmentation to M increases the level sum. Since the degree of every man in M ⊕ M is either zero or two, the path must connect two women, one free in M and one free in M .
LEMMA 2.10. If M is level-maximal, x is a free man with respect to M, w is a woman of maximal level reachable from x by an augmenting path, and p is an augmenting path from x to w, then N = M ⊕ p is level-maximal.
PROOF. Let us look at an alternating path p from a free woman w to a matched woman w (all with respect to N ). We will show that l(w ) ≤ l(w ) and therefore by Lemma 2.9 it follows that N is level-maximal.
If p does not contain any edge from p, then p was an alternating path from a free woman w to a matched woman w in M. Since M is level-maximal, by Lemma 2.9, l(w ) ≤ l(w ).
Let us then assume that p contains some edge(s) from p. Let x denote the first vertex on the path p that belongs to p, which we meet while traversing p from w . Let e denote the first edge belonging to p (see Figure 3) . The vertex x must be a man because all edges incident to vertices on p that do not belong to p cannot belong to the matching N -so the edge of p that leads to x is unmatched by N and recall that we started the traversal of p from the unmatched woman. So, e is matched by N . Let us now look at this part of p that has x at its one end and does not contain e . It has the man x, that was free in M, at its other end (possibly x = x ). Since M ⊕ p = N , the matched edges of path p were exactly the other way around before the augmentation, that is, those edges that are now present in the matching N were not present in the matching M, and vice versa. This means that w was reachable by an alternating path from x in M. Since w is a woman of maximal level reachable from
Analogously, let w 2 denote the first vertex on the path p that belongs to p, which we meet when we traverse p beginning from the matched woman w . Let e denote the first edge belonging to p (see Figure 3) . It is not difficult to notice that w 2 must be a woman. Now, if we look at that part of p that has w 2 at one end and does not contain e , then we notice that it has the woman w at its other end (possibly w = w 2 ). Thus in M there existed an alternating path from the free woman w to the matched woman w and hence, by Lemma 2.9, l(w) ≤ l(w ).
Combining the observations, we get that l(w ) ≤ l(w ).
LEMMA 2.11. M is a level-maximal matching at all times of the execution.
PROOF. We use induction on the steps of the algorithm. Initially, M is empty and therefore level-maximal. For the induction step, assume that M is level-maximal at the beginning of phase i.
First, every free man proposes to the women at the top of his list. This introduces the edge set E i . The level of nonisolated women does not change, the level of women previously but no longer isolated is set to i. M is still level-maximal. Assuming otherwise, then there must be an alternating path from a free woman to a woman of lower level. This path must use one of the new edges. The new edges are incident to free men, a contradiction.
Every woman keeps only her best proposals. For a particular woman w, this has one of two effects: Either she does not drop any incident edge or she keeps only edges in E i (not necessarily all). The matching M may be reduced in size. Let us use M to denote the resulting matching. We claim that it is level-maximal. Assuming otherwise, then there must an alternating path p from a free woman to a woman of lower level. It cannot use any of the new edges, since new edges are incident to free men. Thus p can use only old edges. Also p cannot start at a woman of level i, since only new edges are incident to such a woman. Thus p starts at a woman of level less than i and hence the woman is free with respect to M. Since M ⊆ M, p is alternating with respect to M, a contradiction to the level-maximality of M.
Next, we consider the free men in turn and search for augmenting paths. Let x be a free man.
If no augmenting path starting at x exists, let Z be the set of men reachable by alternating paths from x and let N (Z ) be their neighbors. Then |Z | > |N (Z )|. We delete all lowest-rank edges incident to the women in N (Z ). This may decrease the size of the matching. The matching clearly stays level-maximal.
If an augmenting path exists, let p be an augmenting path to a woman of maximal level. We use p to increase the cardinality of the matching. By Lemma 2.10, the resulting matching is level-maximal.
2.3. THE SEARCH FOR AUGMENTING PATHS AND THE ANALYSIS. We come to the implementation of the search for augmenting paths and the analysis.
Let x be a free man. We need to determine a free woman w of maximal level that is reachable from x and an augmenting path from x to w. Let p be such an augmenting path. Then all women on this path have level at least l(w) by Lemma 2.9. Note that l(w) ≤ l(x). This is because all the women adjacent to x have level at most l(x), so if w is adjacent to x, then l(w) ≤ l(x). If w is not adjacent to x and if l(w) > l(x), then p contains an alternating path from a free woman of higher level (i.e., w) to a matched woman of lower level (the neighbor of x). This contradicts the level-maximality of the matching. Note that the same holds for each man x in p.
We organize the search in rounds l(x), l(x) − 1, l(x) − 2, . . . . In round j, we explore all augmenting paths starting in x and exploring only edges out of vertices of level j or larger. We stop in round j when a free woman of level j is reached by the search or if the alternating tree rooted at x has reached full size. In the former case, j is the maximal level of a woman reachable from x by an augmenting path. In the latter case, no free woman is reachable from x. If the search has not yet stopped, the frontier of the search consists of women of level less than j. In the next round, we continue the search from all women of level j − 1 in the frontier.
In order to find these women, we maintain an array A of buckets (= linear lists) which implements a simple priority queue. All buckets are initially empty. At the beginning of round j, bucket B l , l ≤ j contains the women of level l in the frontier. We also keep an (unsorted) list of nonempty buckets and the total number of women contained in the buckets. We initialize the bucket structure by putting the neighbors of x into appropriate buckets and setting j to l(x). In round j, we continue the search from the women in bucket j. If the bucket is empty and the number of unexplored women positive, we decrease j by one. If the bucket is empty and the number of unexplored women zero, we stop. There is no augmenting path starting at x (failure). If the bucket is nonempty, let w be a woman in the bucket. We remove w from the bucket. If w is free, we stop (success): w is the highest-ranked woman reachable from x. If w is matched, we explore alternating paths from w (starting with matched edges) until a woman of level less than j is reached. These women are then added to their appropriate buckets. When the search stops, we empty all buckets using the list of nonempty buckets.
Let j(x) be the minimal bucket index from which we remove a woman. In the case of failure this is the minimal level of a woman reachable from x and in the case of success this is the maximum level of a woman reachable from x by an augmenting path.
The time for the search from x is proportional to the number k of edges explored in the search plus l(x) − j(x) + 1. We charge this cost as follows. FIG. 4 . When h 1 and h 2 are regarded as the same hospital h with quota 2, then there is a strongly stable matching which matches both r 1 and r 2 to h. However, when two copies of h are made, say, h 1 and h 2 as shown here, then this instance becomes similar to Figure 1 , where there is no strongly stable matching.
In the case of failure, we charge one unit each to every edge deleted (this accounts for k) and we charge l(x) − j(x) + 1 to the minimum-level woman w reachable from x. The first kind of charge adds up to m, since every edge is deleted at most once. The second kind of charge is less than the difference of the current and the next levels of w. Since the maximum level is m, for any woman the total charge of the second kind is bounded by m. We conclude that the total cost of unsuccessful searches is O(nm).
In the case of success, we charge both costs to w. Observe that all edges explored have level at least l(w) (= j(x)) and at most i (= the phase number) and that the level of w jumps to at least i + 1 if it ever becomes free again. Thus every edge can be charged at most once to w. Also l(x) − j(x) + 1 is bounded by the difference between the current level of w and the next level of w. Thus the total charge to w is bounded by O(m). The total cost of successful searches is therefore bounded by O(nm).
THEOREM 2.12. Strongly stable matchings for the classical stable marriage problem can be computed in time O(nm).
Note that the running time of our strongly stable matching algorithm is actually O(|W |m), since the total cost of all unsuccessful searches and augmentations is shared by women and the cost charged to a particular woman sums to at most m over all phases. So, if |W | |X | or |X | |W | (we reverse the roles of men and women and it is free women who propose in every phase and men who pay for the augmentations), we can bound the running time of our algorithm by O(min(|X |, |W |) · m).
Extension to Hospitals-Residents
Recall that the hospitals-residents problem is a many-to-one extension of the classical stable marriage problem. Observe that replacing each hospital h with p h women with preference lists identical to h and running the strongly stable matching algorithm for men-women does not work. This is because there might be a strongly stable matching in the hospitals-residents problem, but no strongly stable matching in the reduced men-women instance. Figure 4 contains such an instance.
We present an O(m h∈H p h ) algorithm for computing a strongly stable matching for the hospitals-residents problem. Our algorithm is based on that in Irving et al. [2003] , which is an O(m 2 ) algorithm. We obtain the improved running time by restricting again all augmentations to result in level-maximal matchings.
3.1. THE ALGORITHM OF IRVING ET AL. We first review a variant of the algorithm in Irving et al. [2003] and then present our modified one. The algorithm in Irving et al. [2003] generalizes the ideas used for computing strongly stable matchings in Irving [1994] and Manlove [1999] to the hospitals-residents problem. A summary of the algorithm, along with our modifications, is presented in Figure 6 .
As in the case of the stable marriage problem, the algorithm proceeds in phases. In any phase, every free resident proposes to all hospitals currently at the top of her/his list and residents become provisionally assigned to hospitals. Each hospital h can accommodate up to p h residents, and needs to keep only the best p h proposals made to it, but if there is a tie in the last place of its list (called the tail), then h can be provisionally assigned to > p h residents. We introduce a few terms: -A hospital is said to be oversubscribed, undersubscribed, or fully subscribed if it is provisionally assigned a number of residents greater than, less than, or equal to its quota, respectively. -A resident r who is provisionally assigned to a hospital h is said to be bound to h if h is not oversubscribed or r is not in h's tail (or both). -A resident r is dominated in a hospital h's list if h prefers to r at least p h residents who are provisionally assigned to it.
The algorithm maintains two graphs G and G c which are subgraphs of G. Here G c is called the provisional assignment graph with edge set E c and G is the graph of edges E not yet considered. During the execution of the algorithm, residents become provisionally assigned to hospitals, which means that edges are moved from G to G c . The algorithm proceeds in the same way as the algorithm in Section 2.1, by deleting edges e = (r, h) which cannot belong to any strongly stable matching.
Reduced Assignment Graph. We maintain a graph G r ⊆ G c called the reduced assignment graph. Residents who appear in G r are those that are not bound to any hospital (we call such residents unbound). So, for any hospital h, the edges incident to h in G r are to the unbound residents, and hence are at the tail of h's list. Each hospital h has a reduced quota p h in the reduced assignment graph, which is the difference between the original quota p h and the number of residents bound to h. So, the vertices of G r are the set of unbound residents and the set of hospitals which are neighbors of the unbound residents. The reduced assignment graph of phase i is denoted as G (i) r . Now the algorithm is very similar to that for the strongly stable marriage, except that we compute maximum matchings in the reduced assignment graph. Initially, G = G; E c = ∅; all the residents are free and G corresponding to the topmost choices of every free resident from E to E c . This denotes free residents being provisionally assigned to hospitals. Whenever a hospital h becomes fully or oversubscribed, then we delete all edges (r, h), where r is dominated on h's list, from G and G c . The reduced assignment graph G
Observe that an edge (r, h) can change state from bound (r is bound to h) to unbound (r is not bound to h), but not vice versa. If a new edge that gets added to G c (corresponding to one of the top choices of a free resident in G (i−1) r ) is a bound edge, then it could cause some bound edges to become unbound or some edges to get deleted. Any edge of G
r . The change of state of an edge (r, h) from bound to unbound need not make the resident r unbound, unless (r, h) was the only bound edge incident to r and now (r, h) has changed state to unbound. Then r , which was not present in G r to match all the unmatched residents. Augmenting Path. In the hospitals-residents setting, a hospital h is considered free in G r if it is not matched up to its reduced quota p h . An alternating path from a free resident to a free hospital is considered an augmenting path.
We iterate over the free residents in arbitrary order. Let r be any free resident. If there is an augmenting path starting at r , we use it to increase the cardinality of the matching. Otherwise, let Z be the set of residents reachable from r by alternating paths and let N (Z ) be the set of hospitals adjacent to Z in E c . For each hospital h ∈ N (Z ) we delete all lowest-ranked edges in E c ∪ E incident to it.
At the end of the phase, we have a maximum matching M in G
r . Also, every free resident is isolated in G c , since the edges incident to her/him were removed when we searched for an augmenting path starting from it. When all free residents have run out of proposals, we need to find a feasible matching M in G c which contains the maximum matching M in G r and matches every bound resident r to a hospital to which r is bound. M is a strongly stable matching if a hospital that was fully or oversubscribed at some point in the execution of the algorithm is fully matched in M or a hospital that was always undersubscribed has a number of assignees in M equal to its degree in G c . The correctness of this algorithm follows from similar proofs of correctness as in Section 2.1 and we refer the reader to Irving et al. [2003] for the exact proofs.
3.2. OUR MODIFICATIONS. Let us extend our definitions in order to capture the somewhat different structure of the hospitals-residents problem.
Definition 3.1. Define the level of an edge e, namely l(e), to be the phase in which e is added to the reduced assignment graph G r . PROOF. If such a path exists, then observe that the endpoint of the path is a hospital matched with a resident. Augmentation increases the level of the matching and does not change the set of matched residents.
For the converse, assume that M is not level-maximal. Let M be a level-maximal matching that matches the same residents. We can decompose M ⊕ M into a set of alternating paths and cycles, all of them edge-disjoint. Augmenting a cycle does not change the level sum. Thus, there must be at least one path whose augmentation to M increases the level sum. Since the degree of every resident in M ⊕ M is either zero or two, the path must connect two hospitals, one free in M and one free in M .
The following lemma and its proof are very similar to Lemma 2.10. PROOF. Let us look at an alternating path p starting with an unmatched edge from a free hospital h to a hospital h (all with respect to N ). We will show that l(h ) ≤ l(h ) and therefore (by Lemma 3.5) N is level-maximal.
If p does not contain any edge from p, then p was an alternating path starting with an unmatched edge from a free hospital h to a hospital h in M. Since M is level-maximal, by Lemma 3.5, l(h ) ≤ l(h ).
Let us then assume that p contains some edge(s) from p. Let u denote the first vertex on the path p that belongs to p, which we meet while traversing p from h . We cannot argue here as in the proof of Lemma 2.10 that u has to be a resident. However, this does not matter. If u is a resident (possibly r = u), it means that the edges e and e (see Figure 5 ) are unmatched in N and if u is a hospital, it means that both e and e are matched in N . Let us look at that part of p, which has u at its one end and the resident r at its other end, that was free in M. Since M ⊕ p = N , the matched edges of path p were exactly the other way around before the augmentation, that is, those edges that are now present in the matching N were not present in the matching M previously, and vice versa. Independent of whether u is a resident or a hospital, it follows that h was reachable by an alternating path from r in M. Since h is a hospital of maximal level reachable from r by an augmenting path, it follows that l(h ) ≤ l(h).
Analogously, let u denote the first vertex on the path p that belongs to p, which we meet when we traverse p beginning with a matched edge from the hospital h . It is not difficult to see that u must be a hospital (possibly u = h). Let us look at that part of p which has u at one end and the hospital h at its other. This path, added to the portion of p between u and h , produces an alternating path in M starting with a free edge from the free hospital h to the hospital h . Hence, by Lemma 3.5,
Combining the observations, we get that l(h ) ≤ l(h ).
LEMMA 3.7. M is a level-maximal matching at all times of the execution.
PROOF. We use induction on the steps of the algorithm. Initially, M is empty and therefore level-maximal. For the induction step assume that M is level-maximal at the beginning of phase i. Free residents propose, and this can introduce two types of edges in G r : (a) edges from G ; and (b) residents who were bound might become unbound and so appear now in G , then its level cannot change. This is because h was oversubscribed and therefore all proposals worse than its current ones (in phase i − 1) have been dominated. On the other hand, if h / ∈ G (i−1) r , then h gets a level equal to i. We claim that M is still level-maximal. Otherwise, it follows from Lemma 3.5 that there must be an alternating path from a free hospital to a hospital of lower level. This path must use new edges, but these new edges are incident to free residents, a contradiction.
By the new proposals, residents might become dominated and therefore edges might be deleted from G c and G r . The matching M ∈ G (i−1) r may be reduced in size. Let M be this resulting matching in G (i) r . Assuming that M is not level-maximal, then there is an alternating path p from a free hospital to a hospital of lower level. It cannot use any of the new edges, since they are incident to free residents. Thus p must use only old edges. Also p cannot start at a hospital of level i, since only new edges are incident to such a hospital. Thus, p starts at hospital of level less than i and hence that hospital is free in M. Since M ⊆ M, p is an alternating path with respect to M, a contradiction to the level-maximality of M.
Next, we consider in turn each free resident in G r and search for augmenting paths. Let r a free resident. If no augmenting path starting from r exists, let Z be the set of residents reachable by alternating paths in G r from r and N (Z ) be their neighbors. Then |Z | > h∈N (Z ) p h . We delete edges in the tail of the hospitals in N (Z ). This may decrease the size of the matching, but the matching stays clearly level-maximal. If an augmenting path exists, let p be an augmenting path to a hospital of maximal level. We use p to increase the cardinality of the matching. By Lemma 3.6, the resulting matching is level-maximal.
3.3. THE RUNNING TIME. The search for augmenting paths in the reduced assignment graph is implemented as in the classical strongly stable marriage problem. The time spent on searches is calculated similarly. Thus, let r be a free resident of level l(r ), for whom we want to determine a free hospital h of maximal level that is reachable from r via an augmenting path. The search is organized exactly as before; in rounds and using buckets. Let j(r ) be the minimal bucket index from which we remove a hospital. The time for the search is proportional to the number k of edges explored plus l(r ) − j(r ) + 1. The cost is charged as previously; in the case of success, everything to the found free hospital h; and in the case of failure, one unit each to every edge deleted (this accounts for k) and l(r ) − j(r ) + 1 to the minimum-level hospital reachable from r .
Reasoning as earlier, we get that the cost of unsuccessful searches is O(|H |m). As for the successes, let us observe that all edges explored during the search have level at least l(h) and at most i (= the phase number) and that the level of h jumps to at least i + 1 if it becomes free again. This means that the set of edges explored during a successful search ending on h while the latter has some level l 1 (h) is disjoint from the set of edges explored during a successful search ending on h when h has some different level l 2 (h). The maximum number of times that a successful augmenting path search ends at h, while the level of h is fixed at l 1 (h), is at most p h . So the cost of all successful searches ending at h is O( p h m), hence the cost of all successful searches is O(( h∈H p h )m).
3.3.1. Implementation Details About the Graphs. In order to maintain and update the provisional and reduced assignment graphs efficiently, we keep useful information about these graphs in the following manner.
The adjacency list of every vertex is sorted according to the preferences of that vertex. The edges of a resident r that are currently in the provisional assignment graph are kept in two lists, called bound and unbound. An edge (r, h) is in the bound list if r is bound to h, otherwise it is in the unbound list.
Every hospital h keeps the information about its quota p h , the number of residents bound to it b h , and the number of residents incident to it that are not bound to it u h . The reduced quota of h is p h , which is equal to p h − b h . Observe that there are three types of residents incident to h: residents bound to h, residents not bound to h but bound to some other hospital h , and residents not bound to any hospital (unbound residents). We assume that h maintains these three types of residents in three separate lists.
The residents belonging to the reduced assignment graph are those whose bound list is empty and unbound list nonempty. Hospitals that belong to the reduced assignment graph are those whose reduced quota is greater than zero. The edges that belong there are the unbound ones. We assume that every edge keeps the information about whether it is in a bound or unbound list and pointers to all the lists to which it belongs.
When the edge (r, h) is moved from E to E c , we check whether it is bound or unbound and update the following information: First we update b h or u h . If the added edge is in the tail of h's list and unbound and if there are any bound edges in the tail, they change state to unbound (such a situation can arise when before adding this edge, there were exactly p h bound edges incident on h and no unbound ones incident on it). Because of the addition of the new edge (r, h), if there are residents that are now dominated in h's list, then those edges should be deleted.
Whenever an edge (r, h) gets added to the provisional assignment graph, gets deleted, or changes state from bound to unbound, we are able to update the information about r and h in constant time (including moving it into or away from the reduced assignment graph). Also, if an edge e appears in G (i) r , then it remains in G ( j) r , j > i until it gets deleted or the algorithm terminates. Since every edge can be added and deleted only once, as well only changing its state from bound to unbound, the total cost of updating and maintaining G c and G r is O(m). 
Conclusions and Open Problems
We have presented an O(nm) algorithm for computing a strongly stable matching or reporting that none exists, given an instance of the stable matching problem. However, there is a lower bound presented in Irving et al. [2003] that if f is any function on n, where f = (n 2 ), then the existence of an O( f (n)) algorithm for deciding whether a strongly stable matching exists in an instance (X∪ W, E) with n vertices implies an O( f (n)) algorithm for deciding whether a given bipartite graph admits a perfect matching. This reduction may be adapted easily to the many-to-one case to show that the existence of an O( f (n)) algorithm for deciding whether a strongly stable matching exists, given an instance of the hospitals-residents problem, implies an O( f (n)) algorithm for deciding whether (R∪ H, E) (where |R| = |H |) admits a degree-constrained subgraph G that satisfies all degree bounds exactly (i.e., each resident has exactly one edge incident to it in G and each hospital h has exactly p h edges incident to it). To the best of our knowledge, the current fastest algorithm for this problem has running time O(m h∈H p(h)) [Gabow 1983 ], where m = |E|.
